To analyze Ukraine's deep and comprehensive integration with the EU we develop a multiregional general-equilibrium simulation model incorporating heterogeneous firms and FDI in business services. This allows for consideration of a.) trade growth in new varieties; b.) aggregate productivity changes attributed to reallocation of resources across and within an industry; c.) productivity growth in manufacturing due to increased access to business services. The results indicate relatively small gains for the EU, whereas Ukraine benefits with a welfare increase over 8%. The deindustrialization impact, previously found by Olekseyuk & Balistreri [2014] in a comparison of different modeling structures, is supported by our findings. Ukraine's welfare gains are higher under an Armington structure compared to monopolistic competition due to a movement of resources into Ukraine's traditional export sectors producing under constant returns. Implementation of the FDI modeling approach and liberalization of barriers to FDI, however, mitigate the deindustrialization impact as multinational firms enter the Ukrainian market, which increases the number of available varieties and, consequently, induces productivity growth of manufacturing sectors due to an improved access to business services.
Introduction
The revolution in Ukraine, Russia's continued aggression in Eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea have drawn the world community's attention. Being in a situation of political and economic crises with high external and public debt, Ukraine receives urgent and necessary economic assistance from the US, the EU, as well as various international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The EU aims to strengthen Ukraine by integrating it to its huge common market. The already signed and ratified Association Agreement/Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (AA/DCFTA) 1 gives Ukraine a chance to increase its competitiveness on world markets, attract new investments and get better access to the European market. 2 However, a large number of reforms as well as economic modernization of Ukraine are needed for the implementation of this new type of agreement which involves more than just bilateral import tariff elimination. It additionally envisages the harmonization of Ukraine's regulations on competition policy, state aid, public procurement, sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures, technical regulations and service trade liberalization.
An analysis of the deep integration between Ukraine and the EU is needed nowadays to provide the parties with valuable information about the transitional impacts, especially after delaying the implementation of the agreement until 2016. 3 In this paper we conduct a comprehensive analysis of the DCFTA's potential effects. Therefore, we look not only at tariff and non-tariff measures (trade facilitation and non-tariff barriers), but also at the liberalization of barriers to FDI in business services in order to consider the full implications of the DCFTA. The last aspect is important as 77.6% of Ukrainian FDI inflows 4 are coming from the EU member countries and almost 54% of total FDI stock is located in service sectors such as financial activities, retail services and real estate. 5 As a central robust finding the DCFTA, with reductions in non-tariff barriers (including the barriers to FDI in services) and trade facilitation improvements, indicates relatively large welfare gains for Ukraine of more than 8%. The positive impact on the EU is small (up to 0.06%) whereas no measurable effect is found for the rest of the world region, but Russia and other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries experience minor welfare losses as a result of the DCFTA.
Our analysis is innovative in its approach as we analyze the DCFTA between Ukraine and the EU in the new modeling framework combining the latest developments in trade theory (i.e., Melitz [2003] ) with explicit consideration of FDI in business services. Moreover, we aim to compare the results with the findings of Olekseyuk & Balistreri [2014] who focus on the implications of different trade structures (Armington [1969] , Krugman [1980] , Melitz [2003] ).
For this purpose we extend their multi-regional general-equilibrium simulation model allowing for the presence of multinational firms providing business services in Ukraine. This means that while in manufacturing foreign firms supply Ukrainian markets only on a cross-border basis, business services can be supplied by foreign firms both operating in Ukraine (FDI case) and abroad (cross-border supply). Therefore, we take not only the traditional gains from trade into account, but also: a.) the additional gains from new varieties due to monopolistic competition; b.) the aggregate productivity growth due to within industry reallocation of resources (according to the Melitz trade structure); c.) as well as productivity growth of the manufacturing sectors due to increased number of available business services.
The extension of the model, compared to Olekseyuk & Balistreri [2014] , leads in all scenarios to higher welfare effects. However, the gains for Ukraine are still higher under the Armington structure in comparison to monopolistic competition. This deindustrialization impact, previously found by Olekseyuk & Balistreri [2014] , arises due to reallocation of resources into Ukraine's traditional export sectors producing under constant returns. Trade liberalization intensifies the production and exports of agriculture and other sectors in which Ukraine has a traditional comparative advantage, while the increasing returns sectors (including business services) shrink in the face of EU based import competition. Our result is consistent with the findings of Arkolakis et al. [2012] , Balistreri et al. [2010] and Olekseyuk & Balistreri [2014] . They also show that the Armington specification can indicate larger gains if trade liberalization draws resources away from the increasing returns sectors producing under monopolistic competition as the number of available varieties declines. Though, incorporation of FDI and liberalization of the barriers to FDI mitigate the deindustrialization impact as the gap between the welfare results under Armington formulation and monopolistic competition decreases. The reason consists in new entries of multinational firms in business services which lead to an increase of the number of available varieties within the country and, consequently, induce productivity growth of manufacturing sectors due to increased access to business services. from the deeper integration (5.83%) are higher than from the simple tariff reduction (1.76%).
The same question is analyzed by Francois & Manchin [2009] in a multi-regional GTAP based model with a higher number of included CIS countries. 7 According to their results, a bilateral tariff reduction alone would lead to a decrease of real income for the CIS region as a whole and for Ukraine in particular (-0.83 and -2.12%, respectively) . Adding services liberalization and reduction of barriers to efficient trade facilitation (the DCFTA scenario), they find a smaller real income decrease for Ukraine of -0.4%. Focusing on the agricultural sectors of the GTAP7 dataset, von Cramon-Taubadel et al. [2010] find that a 50% reduction in bilateral tariffs would only result in moderate gains for Ukraine and the EU. Thus, the greatest possible benefit is found in case of improved agricultural productivity modeled by a 5% exogenous boost in technical change.
Movchan & Giucci [2011] investigate a broader range of Ukraine's integration strategies. They compare the effects of different FTAs with the EU on the one hand and Ukraine's deeper integration within the customs union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan on the other hand. Simulating the DCFTA with a 2.5% reduction of border dead-weight costs on trade in addition to tariff elimination, they find a long-run welfare effect of 11.8% which is significantly higher than the impact of a simple FTA (4.6%). Thus, an alternative implementation of a joint external tariff in case of the customs union would lead to a welfare loss up to 3.7%.
While some of the aforementioned studies 8 incorporate increasing returns to scale and largegroup monopolistic competition in selected manufacturing and service sectors, Olekseyuk & Balistreri [2014] analyze the potential effects of the DCFTA assuming monopolistic competition among heterogeneous firms. Moreover, they compare the results across three models with alternative trade structures: a.) a standard specification of perfect competition based on the Armington [1969] assumption of regionally differentiated goods; b.) monopolistic competition among symmetric firms consistent with Krugman [1980] ; and c.) a competitive selection model of heterogeneous firms consistent with Melitz [2003] . Their results show that the DCFTA, with reductions in non-tariff barriers and trade facilitation improvements, will cause relatively large welfare gains for Ukraine of more than 3%. Furthermore, this study illustrates a novel result that there is little danger of deindustrialization dominating the overall welfare gains as the welfare results under monopolistic competition are substantially lower compared to the standard Armington structure. This occurs because Ukraine intensifies its production and exports in agriculture and other sectors in which it has a traditional comparative advantage, while the increasing returns sectors (producing under monopolistic competition) shrink in the face of the EU based import competition.
The review of previous research reveals that an explicit modeling of FDI as well as liberalization of barriers to FDI in business services remain out of scope of the aforementioned studies.
According to Tarr [2013] , it is important to have a modeling framework which allows for the analysis of this kind of liberalization due to the growing importance of services trade and FDI in services. Summarizing the results from different studies he finds that liberalization of bar-riers against FDI in services yields welfare gains several times larger than the usual estimates from traditional CGE models, which focus on goods trade. This occurs due to the fact that a reduction or elimination of FDI barriers in services sectors (e.g., telecommunication, banking, insurance, transportation and other business services) improves domestic firms' access to highquality services and, consequently, leads to a reduction of costs of doing business, increases firms' productivity and improves the economy's competitiveness on world markets. The importance of FDI modeling is also supported by Christen et al. [2013] , who broadly review the literature on market access in services. Comparing various approaches for the modeling of services liberalization, they also come to the conclusion that the reduction of barriers in services can generate much larger welfare effects than goods liberalization. Furthermore, they argue that an extension of CGE models to include FDI is crucial as it is a major channel for the international exchange of services.
Focusing on the modeling of FDI in business services with the assumption of large-group monopolistic competition (i.e., Krugman-based models with Dixit-Stiglitz structure), a lot of research has been done for many developing countries such as Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Tunisia, Kenya, Tanzania and other East African countries. In particular, Konan & Maskus Regarding Ukraine, Jensen et al. [2005] is the only study incorporating the FDI structure in services in a CGE model with increasing returns to scale and large-group monopolistic competition in some manufacturing sectors. They investigate the impact of Ukraine's WTO accession and show that the aggregate welfare gains are mainly driven by FDI reforms. They find a welfare increase of 2.3% from the reduction of barriers that discriminate against foreign services providers, whereas the average welfare effect amounts to 4.7%. Moreover, using a firm-level dataset She-9 Balistreri et al. [2014] apply a multi-regional simulation model for East Africa and show that the gains from liberalization of FDI in services are dominant in the overall impact (compared to the effects from reduction of NTBs and barriers to efficient trade facilitation) only if countries have relatively high barriers against foreign service providers. This is found for Rwanda, Kenya and Uganda.
potylo & Vakhitov [2012] show a strong positive impact on the productivity of Ukrainian firms from better access to services and from services liberalization. In particular, a standard deviation increase in services liberalization is associated with a 9% increase in total factor productivity. 10
Given this literature review, one can notice that there is a gap which consists in the lack of the general-equilibrium simulation models combining the competitive selection of heterogeneous firms with the explicit modeling of FDI in business services. Incorporation of heterogeneous firms is also mentioned by Tarr [2013] and Jensen & Tarr [2012] as an important extension of the models with FDI structure. Therefore, we contribute to the literature by filling this gap in our analysis for the DCFTA between Ukraine and the EU.
Model description
Our empirical multi-region model is directly developed from the model presented by Olekseyuk & Balistreri [2014] . The backbone of the modeling exercise consists of a typical CGE model with standard assumptions of perfect competition, Constant Returns to Scale (CRTS) and regional differentiation (Armington [1969] ). Though, we allow for imperfect competition and Increasing
Returns to Scale (IRTS) in some manufacturing sectors and business services. Figure 1 Arnold et al. [2011] , allowing foreign entry in services appears to be the key channel through which services liberalization contributes to improved performance of manufacturing sectors. Fernandes & Paunov [2012] provide a proof for increased total factor productivity of manufacturing sectors in Chile induced by a rise of FDI in services. 11 This supply elasticity is used in the partial equilibrium models for Krugman and Melitz formulation. Figure 1 ). Allowing for imperfect competition and IRTS in some selected manufacturing sectors and business services, we differentiate between domestic and foreign products at the firm level. This requires an assumption of the same substitution elasticity between firms and products. 12 Thus, the composite of the firm level goods is modeled by a single level CES function with all domestic and imported varieties competing directly (see the structure for good 20 or for business services in Figure 1) . General equilibrium is then defined by zero profits for all producers, balanced budgets for representative agents in each region, as well as by market clearance for all goods and factor markets.
Extending the initial model with explicit consideration of FDI in business services, we allow for the existence of two types of firms: (i) domestic firms producing in Ukraine for home and foreign markets and (ii) multinational firms producing in Ukraine for the local market with the FDI from other regions (EU, CIS, rest of the world). 13 Therefore, these FDI firms (or multinational firms) produce a specific variety in Ukraine, which is differentiated from domestic and other host county varieties (i.e., imported services). Thus, in these sectors we implement large-group monopolistic competition among symmetric firms producing under the same IRTS technology, which was suggested by Krugman [1980] . 14 The costs of domestic firms are defined by the costs of Ukrainian primary factors and intermediate inputs. For FDI firms, the cost structure differs as, in addition to Ukrainian production factors and intermediates, they import specialized foreign inputs. Moreover, the barriers to FDI raise the costs of multinational firms and, consequently, affect their profitability and entry. A liberalization of such barriers induces foreign entry and leads to productivity gains due to increased number of available varieties (according to the Dixit 12 The inter-variety elasticity of substitution sigi is equal to 3.8 which is consistent with the plant-level empirical analysis of Bernard et al. [2003] . 13 Due to data availability we implement this FDI structure only for Ukraine as the country of interest. 14 A detailed specification of the Krugman model equations is provided in the appendix 8.1.
& Stiglitz [1977] variety effect). 15
Following Olekseyuk & Balistreri [2014] , sectors with a high share of intra-industry trade (over 60%) are assumed to produce under IRTS technology. Moreover, for these sectors we implement monopolistic competition with competitive selection of heterogeneous firms according to Melitz [2003] . This allows to capture the trade-policy induced changes in aggregate productivity due to a within industry reallocation of factors from less to more productive plants (including exit of the lowest productivity firms). 16 The first one (S1) includes only a bilateral elimination of import tariffs. In the second counterfactual simulation (S2) we additionally reduce the NTBs and barriers to efficient trade facilitation by 20%. To be able to simulate an upper bound for trade liberalization between Ukraine and the EU we reduce the trade facilitation barriers to the intra EU level in the third simulation (S3).
Extending the previous analysis we add a unilateral reduction of discriminatory barriers to FDI by 50% in the fourth scenario (S4). 20 As the deep and comprehensive integration with the EU involves the harmonization of Ukrainian legislation and polices, it will lead to a strong reduction of the barriers against European suppliers of business services. We run each simulation three times (see Table 2 ). The first run of each counterfactual simulation (S1.A, S2.A, S3.A and S4.A) provides the results under Armington trade formulation. In the second run (S1.M, S2.M, S3.M and S4.M) we assume a Melitz structure with competitive selection of heterogeneous firms for the IRTS sectors. In addition, large-group monopolistic competition among symmetric firms producing under the same IRTS technology (Krugman structure) is assumed for business services in the third run (S1.MK, S2.MK, S3.MK and S4.MK).
17 See Tables A.9 and A.10 for detailed mapping of GTAP regions and sectors to our model. 18 For NTBs we use the AVEs estimated by Kee et al. [2009] ; for barriers to trade facilitation see Minor [2013] , Hummels [2007] , Hummels et al. [2007] , Hummels & Schaur [2013] ; detailed description of aggregation procedure is provided by Olekseyuk & Balistreri [2014] . 19 They provide tariff equivalents for the following sectors: accounting and legal services; air, rail, road and maritime transport; banking and insurance; fixed and mobile line; retail. All values except of retail sector are used in our calculations. 20 A bilateral liberalization is not simulated due to the lack of data concerning the FDI firms in the EU (shares of output captured by multinational firms and shares of specialized imported inputs).
Results
According to the aggregate results of counterfactual experiments (see Table 3 ), free trade area occurs to be welfare increasing for Ukraine and the EU, what is supported by a rise in real GDP by at most 5.67% and 0.05%, respectively. Thereby, higher and broader reductions of barriers would bring higher benefits for both trade partners. While the EU can gain from the policy reform only with a small rise of welfare up to 0.06%, Ukraine's benefits are much higher with a welfare increase up to 11,73%. 21 Only in scenario S1.M and S1.MK Ukraine experiences a reduction of real GDP up to 0.1% and a decline of welfare by maximum of 0.13%. The reason for these negative results is the trade-induced net exit of firms and, therefore, a lower number of available varieties in the monopolistic competition models. This outcome is consistent with the findings of Arkolakis et al. [2012] , Balistreri et al. [2010] and Olekseyuk & Balistreri [2014] .
As trade liberalization happens only between Ukraine and the EU, other regions are negatively affected. While trade diversion from the rest of the world is relatively small and has almost no impact on real GDP, consumption and welfare, the CIS region is affected more strongly with a welfare decrease between 0.01% and 0.11%. Comparing our results to the model without incorporated FDI structure (see Table A .13), we observe an increase in the welfare impact for
Ukraine in all comparable scenarios ranging from 0.06 to 0.33 percentage points. This highlights the importance of our improved model structure allowing multinational firms to increase their demand for Ukrainian primary factors of production and, therefore, enable the higher welfare impact. Concerning factor earnings, Table 4 indicates an increase of remuneration for all Ukrainian production factors with the highest rise for unskilled labor and natural resources. This indicates a reallocation of production to the sectors producing with an intensive use of aforementioned production factors. 22 Somewhat opposite results arise for the EU: while factor returns for labor and capital rise slightly, the remuneration for provision of natural resources declines suggesting an opposite specialization of the EU. Concerning other regions, natural resources constitute the only primary factor which loses from trade liberalization in ROW and benefits in the CIS region.
This demonstrates a deepening of the CIS specialization on resource-intensive goods, especially taking the reduced factor returns for all other production factors into account. Table 5 ), policy reform induces an exit of Ukrainian firms in all service sectors except transport (TRS). The number of European multinational firms operating in Ukraine also declines in the first three scenarios, which leads to a reduction of the set of services produced in Ukraine.
Only in the last simulation (S4.MK) the liberalization of barriers to FDI causes a switch from cross-border supply to establishing a multinational firm, so the number of EU firms operating in Ukraine increases strongly. Considering the IRTS goods under Melitz trade structure, we also observe a noticeable decline in the number of Ukrainian firms operating in domestic market (see Table A .14) for all IRTS sectors except trade (TRD). The same occurs for Ukrainian cross-border firms operating in foreign markets with the exception of machinery and equipment (MEQ) and the wood and paper industry (WPP). Thus, the number of European cross-border firms operating in Ukraine increases strongly which documents the EU's comparative advantage in the IRTS goods. This explains the contrary welfare effects for the EU which are higher under monopolistic competition than under the Armington structure. Considering the total number of varieties consumed under the Melitz trade structure (see Table 6 ), we find an increase for all IRTS sectors in the EU which occurs because of the higher number of imported varieties in all considered sectors (see Figure 2) . For Ukraine the results of total number of consumed varieties are negative in all IRTS sectors due to the reduction of both domestic and imported varieties (see Figure 3) . 23 However, simply counting the varieties to explain the welfare changes along the extensive margin can be misleading as varieties enter the expenditure system under different prices. To take this into account we calculate the so-called Feenstra ratio 24 and report the percentage change of this ratio at the bottom panel of Table   6 . The results indicate no losses along the extensive margin for both trading partners. 25 This means that lost varieties in Ukraine represent low productivity goods with relatively high prices and low quantities, so that net impact is positive. 23 Only manufacture of machinery and equipment (MEQ), textiles (TEX) and wood and paper industry (WPP) demonstrate an increase of imported varieties in Ukraine However, it is not enough to compensate for the losses of Ukrainian domestic varieties. 24 Comparing equilibria t versus t − 1, Feenstra [2010] shows that the variety gains can be measured by deviations in the following ratio from unity: λ t hr /λ t−1 hr −1/(σ h −1) , where λ z hr is region-r's share of expenditures at equilibrium z on good-h varieties available in both equilibria to the total expenditures on good-h varieties at z. 25 Only in S1 there are some losses in Ukrainian trade sector (TRD) form tariff reduction induced changes in the number of varieties. 
Conclusions
To analyze the establishment of the DCFTA between Ukraine and the EU we develop an improved multi-regional general-equilibrium simulation model based on Olekseyuk & Balistreri [2014] with different setups. First, we apply a standard specification of manufacturing and services trade based on perfect competition and the Armington assumption of regionally differentiated goods. Second, we implement monopolistic competition with competitive selection of 26 Only for Ukraine in scenario S1.M we observe a qualitative switch from negative to positive results with the lower value for esubm and sig as well as upper value for esupply, which happens for different reasons. For instance, lower substitutability between foreign goods from differen regions (esubm) leads to the lower increases in trade flows and number of available varieties decreases less, which allows for a small welfare increase. A rise of esupply causes an increase of the top nest elasticity of substitution between sector-specific capital and the rest of the inputs which leads to the slight welfare increase after tariff elimination. Balistreri [2014] , the results for factor earnings indicate a deeper specialization of Ukraine in labor and resource-intensive goods whereas an opposite specialization is observed for the EU. There is also limited trade diversion from ROW and CIS combined with a slight decrease in real GDP and welfare mainly for the CIS region, which is specialized in resource-intensive goods.
Comparing the welfare results for Ukraine across the different model specifications we observe the same deindustrialization impact as Olekseyuk & Balistreri [2014] . Even with the higher welfare effects in all scenarios of the extended model, the gains for Ukraine are still substantially higher under the Armington structure in comparison to monopolistic competition. Thus, Ukraine's deeper integration with the EU intensifies import competition in the increasing returns sectors, while inducing a movement of resources into Ukraine's traditional export sectors which produce under constant returns (e.g., agriculture, food processing). Therefore, the set of available varieties decreases which leads to lower gains under the assumption of monopolistic competition.
This finding is also consistent with Arkolakis et al. [2012] and Balistreri et al. [2010] .
Though, our results demonstrate that incorporation of FDI structure is important as it allows for the consideration of multinational firms producing in the destination country using its primary (6) and (7) Composite-input market c krs :
Unit cost index (8) Producers face the same regional demand (Q kr ) for the sectoral composite service (including imported and domestic varieties) which is determined in the general equilibrium (GE). The aggregate demand equation for business services is given by:
where η ≥ 0 30 is the price elasticity of demand, P kr is a composite price of service k in region r and symbols with a bar indicate benchmark (calibrated) levels. Thus, for each iteration of the PE model aggregate demand is recentered at the last GE solution point.
Let p krs be the firm-level price (gross of trade cost and taxes) set by a firm from region r selling in market s (i.e., cross-border and domestic firms). For multinational firms this firm-level price is defined by p M krs , where the firm produces in s due to FDI from r. Taking the two different types of service providers into account, the Dixit-Stiglitz price index for a composite business service k in region s is given by:
where σ k > 1 is the elasticity of substitution, λ krs indicates the bilateral preference weights and N kr is the number of active domestic and cross-border firms in region r. λ M krs and N M krs denote the same variables as λ krs and N kr , but for multinational firms producing in s with the FDI from r. The corresponding bilateral firm-level demand for domestic and cross-border firms q krs (e.g., services supplied to region s by a firm from r) is defined by:
29 Index ss is also used to indicate a destination region, but other than s which is already used in the equation. 30 The price elasticity of demand is assumed to be equal 0.75.
This equation applies also to the firm-level demand of the FDI firms q M krs with the bilateral preference weights λ M krs and r = s. Assuming large-group monopolistic competition we allow firms to have some market power over their unique variety. However, their pricing has a negligible impact on the composite price P ks , so they face a constant-elasticity demand with P ks assumed constant. Firms maximize their profits by setting a price with an optimal markup over marginal cost:
-For domestic and cross-border firms:
-For FDI firms: p
where t krs (or t kss ) indicates a composite tax rate (includes tariffs and subsidies) and c krs (or c krr ) is a composite input unit cost, so that c krr τ krs (or c krs τ kss ) constitute the marginal cost of delivering product k from region r to s (or within s) under the iceberg cost assumption.
As the firms incur a fixed cost f 31 in addition to marginal cost, zero profit condition indicates that the number of firms (a complementary variable) will adjust such that nominal fixed cost payments equal profits. Again, there are two zero profit conditions in the PE model: one for service providers producing domestically for home and foreign markets and one for multinational firms producing in the host county. For domestic and cross-border firms, the costs in the home country r and profits from all destination markets s are relevant, therefore, the equation is given by:
For FDI firms, both the cost payments and profits in the host country s are relevant. Thus, we take the costs of operation on the r to s link (c krs f krs , r = s) into account and zero profit condition is given by:
The last equation of the Krugman PE model for business services is a market clearance condition for the composite input: 
The left-hand side represents the total input supply Y krs considering both types of firms. The supply elasticity µ ≥ 0 32 is determined in the GE model and recentered at the last GE solution for each iteration. The right-hand side constitutes the total demand for composite inputs where τ krs is considered as a real cost of delivering q krs units to region s. This PE model as well as the PE model for Melitz goods, which incorporate the industrial organization in selected sectors, are connected to the constant-returns GE model using the decomposition algorithm 33 described by Balistreri & Rutherford [2013] . Therefore, we solve the industrial organization models in isolation from aggregate income changes. This allows us to avoid dealing with computational limits caused by excessively high dimensionalities that would otherwise arise in case of a large number of commodities, regions and agents. 
